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Abstract
We investigate the implications of consumer nationalism for multilateral trade coop-
eration. We develop a two-country, two-firm model, in which the firms produce horizon-
tally differentiated products and act as Bertrand competitors. Assuming that there is
asymmetry in consumer nationalism between countries, we show that the country with
the (relatively more) nationalist consumers can sustain more liberal trade policies than
its trade partner in a repeated-game setting. Moreover, its most cooperative equilibrium
tariff is actually decreasing in the level of its consumers’ nationalism, provided that coun-
tries are not too patient. On the other hand, asymmetric consumer nationalism across
countries produces an anti-cooperation effect on the incentives of the country with the
non-nationalist consumers.
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1 Introduction
The world has been experiencing a revival of economic nationalism in recent years. The
most prominent manifestations of this trend are the election of Donald J. Trump as the 45th
President of the United States on the platform of “Make America Great Again” as well as
the outcome of the Brexit referendum. This new wave of economic nationalism—intertwined
with populism—poses a serious threat to the liberal international order that has dominated
the world after World War II, key elements of which are economic openness and multilateral
institutions (Ikenberry, 2018). In fact, the elevated trade tensions between the United States
and its major trade partners in the Trump era clearly attest how grave this threat is. In this
paper, we focus on the consumer side and assess theoretically the implications of consumer
nationalism for multilateral trade cooperation.
Consumer nationalism or consumer ethnocentrism—with the latter term being extensively
used in the international business literature—refers to the phenomenon of consumer bias
against foreign products and in favor of domestic ones. According to the seminal work by
Shimp and Sharma (1987, page 280), for ethnocentric consumers, “purchasing imported prod-
ucts is wrong because, in their minds, it hurts the domestic economy, causes loss of jobs,
and is plainly unpatriotic,”1 whereas for non-ethnocentric consumers, “foreign products are
objects to be evaluated on their own merits without consideration for where they are made.”
A large number of empirical studies have demonstrated that consumer ethnocentrism has a
significant impact on consumers’ buying intentions and purchase behavior toward domestic
and imported products (see, for example, Shimp and Sharma, 1987; Herche, 1992; Nielsen and
Spence, 1997; Watson and Wright, 2000; Shoham and Makovec Brencˇicˇ, 2003; Nguyen et al.,
2008). It is therefore natural to ask what the implications of consumer nationalism are for the
world trading system and, in particular, for multilateral tariff cooperation. To the best of our
knowledge, this question has not been addressed so far in the literature. This is the objective
of this paper, which explores the ramifications of consumer nationalism for multilateral trade
cooperation in the context of self-enforcing cooperative agreements.
1Similarly, Sharma et al. (1995, page 27) argue that for highly ethnocentric consumers, “[n]ot buying
foreign imports is good, appropriate, desirable, and patriotic; buying them is bad, inappropriate, undesirable,
and irresponsible.”
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We develop a two-country, two-firm model, in which the firms produce horizontally differ-
entiated products and engage in Bertrand price competition. We model consumer nationalism
as a demand shifter. More specifically, stronger nationalist consumer preferences translate in
our framework into an outward shift of the demand for the domestic product along with
an inward shift of the demand for the import product. Moreover, we assume that there is
asymmetry in consumer nationalism between the two trade partners, which is in line with the
empirical findings in the literature on cross-country differences in consumer ethnocentrism
(see, for instance, Good and Huddleston, 1995; Pereira et al., 2002; Han, 2017; Han and Won,
2018). The governments and firms interact in an infinitely repeated two-stage game: in the
first stage, the governments select their import tariffs, while in the second stage, the firms
choose their prices in both markets. We finally assume—as is standard in the literature on
trade agreements—that countries are limited to self-enforcing multilateral agreements, i.e.,
agreements balancing for each country its short-term gains from defection from the agreed-
upon trade policies against its long-term welfare losses due to the trade war its unilateral
defection would ignite.
Three main results emerge from our analysis. First, the non-cooperative Nash tariff of a
given country is decreasing in the degree of domestic consumer nationalism. The dominant
force driving this result is the fact that consumer nationalism reduces the demand for imports,
thereby having a dampening effect on a country’s tariff-revenue gain from marginally raising
its import tariff. Second, the country with the (relatively more) nationalist consumers is able
to maintain more liberal trade policies than its trade partner in our repeated-game setting. In
fact, for a sufficiently low discount factor, the most cooperative equilibrium tariff of the former
is decreasing in the level of its consumers’ nationalism; by contrast, as far as the country with
the non-nationalist consumers is concerned, its most cooperative equilibrium tariff is always
increasing in the degree of nationalism characterizing its trade partner’s consumers. This is
our third main finding. Intuitively, consumer nationalism in a given country has a negative
impact on its potential one-time gains from deviation from the cooperative course as well
as on both trade partners’ per-period benefit from cooperation. In other words, asymmetric
consumer nationalism across countries produces an anti-cooperation effect on the incentives
of the country with the non-nationalist consumers, while in the case of the country with the
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nationalist ones, there are two offsetting forces at work. However, for a sufficiently small
discount factor, its pro-cooperation effect on the latter country’s incentives—i.e., its negative
impact on the country’s one-time gains from cheating—unambiguously dominates.
It is important to stress here that our results extend to the more general case in which
there is a home bias in consumption or, equivalently for our purposes, there are border ef-
fects on trade flows (see, for example, McCallum, 1995; Trefler, 1995; Chen, 2004; Bru¨lhart
and Trionfetti, 2009; Mika, 2017). Of course, a home bias in demand can arise for reasons
very different from consumer ethnocentrism—for instance, due to the natural advantage of
domestic industries vis-a`-vis foreign producers in the provision of after-sales service (see page
5 in Blonigen and Wilson, 1999). However, all our results carry through in the case of asym-
metric consumption home bias across countries—independently of its source—provided that
the bias in question entails an outward shift of the demand for domestically produced goods
accompanied by an inward shift of the demand for imports.
Few papers in the economics and political science literature look at the interplay between
nationalism/patriotism and international trade or trade policy. In a theoretical contribution,
Eriksson (2011) focuses on agriculture, and explores the ramifications of patriotic consumer
preferences for agricultural policy—in the form of an import tariff or a production subsidy—in
the context of a small open economy and using the median-voter approach. In an empirical
study instead, Michaels and Zhi (2010) examine the deterioration of relations between the
United States and France during 2002–2003 over the use of military force against Iraq, and
estimate the impact of this deterioration on their bilateral trade. Other papers look at the
reverse question, i.e., how international trade affects countries’ level of nationalism. For ex-
ample, Lan and Li (2015) provide robust evidence that both at the regional level within China
and at the country level across 15 different countries, the level of nationalism is decreasing
in the degree of economic openness. On the other hand, in a recent paper, Colantone and
Stanig (forthcoming) focus on the surge in imports from China in 15 European countries over
1988–2007, and find that at the district level within the countries in question, a larger import
shock leads to an increase in political support for nationalist and isolationist parties as well
as for radical-right parties. Last, a number of papers investigate the determinants of individ-
ual attitudes toward trade, including the role played (or not) by nationalist views or feelings
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among individuals in shaping their trade preferences (see, for instance, Mayda and Rodrik,
2005; Mansfield and Mutz, 2009; Rho and Tomz, 2017).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section sets out the basics of
our model. Section 3 derives the non-cooperative Nash tariff equilibrium that would emerge in
a one-shot interaction between countries. Section 4 analyzes the implications of asymmetric
consumer nationalism across countries for multilateral tariff cooperation in the context of
asymmetric multilateral trade agreements, whereas Section 5 repeats the analysis focusing on
symmetric agreements. Finally, Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We assume that the world consists of two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F ). There
exists one firm in each country: firm h in Home and firm f in Foreign. The two firms
produce horizontally differentiated products—i.e., consumers view firms’ products as imperfect
substitutes for each other. Markets are segmented and firms compete in prices a` la Bertrand
in both countries.
The demand for product i ∈ {h, f} in country j ∈ {H,F}, qji , is given by:
qji
(
pji , p
j
−i
)
= αji − βji pji + γji pj−i, (1)
where pji is the price charged by firm i in market j and −i ∈ {h, f} \ {i}. Moreover, αji , βji ,
and γji are positive constants, while β
j
i > γ
j
i (i.e., demand is more responsive to own-price
changes than cross-price ones).2 On the production side, the firms have constant marginal
costs, ch and cf , and no fixed cost of production. We further assume that α
j
i > β
j
i ci.
The governments and firms engage in a two-stage game as follows:
Stage 1: The two governments simultaneously pick specific (non-prohibitive) tariffs so as to max-
imize national welfare.
Stage 2: The two firms simultaneously select their prices in both markets so as to maximize their
aggregate profit.
2Note that γji > 0 reflects the fact that the goods are substitutes.
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3 One-Shot Game
We first characterize the tariff equilibrium that would emerge in a non-cooperative environ-
ment. In particular, let us assume that the governments and firms engage in a one-shot
interaction. We solve our two-stage game backwards in order to identify its subgame-perfect
Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
3.1 Stage 2: Bertrand Competition
Let τ j denote the import tariff imposed by country j ∈ {H,F}. The aggregate profits of firms
h and f , respectively, from sales in both markets equal:
pih =
(
pHh − ch
)
qHh
(
pHh , p
H
f
)
+
(
pFh − ch − τF
)
qFh
(
pFh , p
F
f
)
and (2)
pif =
(
pFf − cf
)
qFf
(
pFf , p
F
h
)
+
(
pHf − cf − τH
)
qHf
(
pHf , p
H
h
)
. (3)
It is immediate to show that
(
∂2pii/∂p
j
i∂p
j
−i
)
= γji > 0, meaning that firms’ prices in a given
market are strategic complements.
Each firm chooses two prices, and setting
(
∂pii/∂p
j
i
)
= 0 for j ∈ {H,F}, we obtain firm
i’s (i ∈ {h, f}) first-order conditions, yielding:
pHh =
αHh + β
H
h ch + γ
H
h p
H
f
2βHh
, (4)
pFh =
αFh + β
F
h
(
ch + τ
F
)
+ γFh p
F
f
2βFh
, (5)
pFf =
αFf + β
F
f cf + γ
F
f p
F
h
2βFf
, and (6)
pHf =
αHf + β
H
f
(
cf + τ
H
)
+ γHf p
H
h
2βHf
. (7)
Finally, straightforward algebra provides us with the Bertrand–Nash equilibrium prices charged
by firms in the two markets:
pHhNash =
2βHf
(
αHh + β
H
h ch
)
+ γHh
[
αHf + β
H
f
(
cf + τ
H
)]
4βHh β
H
f − γHh γHf
, (8)
pFhNash =
2βFf
[
αFh + β
F
h
(
ch + τ
F
)]
+ γFh
(
αFf + β
F
f cf
)
4βFf β
F
h − γFf γFh
, (9)
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pFfNash =
2βFh
(
αFf + β
F
f cf
)
+ γFf
[
αFh + β
F
h
(
ch + τ
F
)]
4βFf β
F
h − γFf γFh
, and (10)
pHfNash =
2βHh
[
αHf + β
H
f
(
cf + τ
H
)]
+ γHf
(
αHh + β
H
h ch
)
4βHh β
H
f − γHh γHf
. (11)
The resulting equilibrium quantities, then, equal:
qHhNash =
βHh
{
2αHh β
H
f − ch
(
2βHh β
H
f − γHh γHf
)
+ γHh
[
αHf + β
H
f
(
cf + τ
H
)]}
4βHh β
H
f − γHh γHf
, (12)
qFhNash =
βFh
[
2αFh β
F
f −
(
2βFf β
F
h − γFf γFh
) (
ch + τ
F
)
+ γFh
(
αFf + β
F
f cf
)]
4βFf β
F
h − γFf γFh
, (13)
qFfNash =
βFf
{
2αFf β
F
h − cf
(
2βFf β
F
h − γFf γFh
)
+ γFf
[
αFh + β
F
h
(
ch + τ
F
)]}
4βFf β
F
h − γFf γFh
, and (14)
qHfNash =
βHf
[
2αHf β
H
h −
(
2βHh β
H
f − γHh γHf
) (
cf + τ
H
)
+ γHf
(
αHh + β
H
h ch
)]
4βHh β
H
f − γHh γHf
. (15)
It is important to note here than an increase in τH raises the equilibrium prices of both
goods in Home, with the impact on pHfNash being relatively larger (in absolute terms).
3 In
addition, a higher τH results in a market-share gain for firm h in its domestic market at the
expense of firm f , as
∂qHhNash
∂τH
=
βHh β
H
f γ
H
h
4βHh β
H
f −γHh γHf
> 0 while
∂qHfNash
∂τH
= −β
H
f (2βHh βHf −γHh γHf )
4βHh β
H
f −γHh γHf
< 0.4
Analogous relationships hold for Foreign as far as changes in its tariff level are concerned.
3.2 Stage 1: Tariff Equilibrium
We define the welfare of country j ∈ {H,F}, W j, as the sum of consumer surplus (from
consumption of both goods), domestic firm’s aggregate profit, and tariff revenue. More specif-
ically:
WH
(
τH , τF
)
=
∫ αHh +γHh pHf
βH
h
pHh
qHh
(
pHh , p
H
f
)
dpHh +
∫ αHf +γHf pHh
βH
f
pHf
qHf
(
pHf , p
H
h
)
dpHf
+pih + τ
HqHf
(
pHf , p
H
h
)
and (16)
3From Equations (8) and (11), we have that
∂pHhNash
∂τH
=
γHh β
H
f
4βHh β
H
f −γHh γHf
<
∂pHfNash
∂τH
=
2βHh β
H
f
4βHh β
H
f −γHh γHf
since
γHh < 2β
H
h .
4The term “market share” here and throughout the paper refers to unit market share.
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W F
(
τF , τH
)
=
∫ αFf +γFf pFh
βF
f
pFf
qFf
(
pFf , p
F
h
)
dpFf +
∫ αFh +γFh pFf
βF
h
pFh
qFh
(
pFh , p
F
f
)
dpFh
+pif + τ
F qFh
(
pFh , p
F
f
)
. (17)
With Equations (16)–(17) in place, we may now derive the best-response tariffs for Home
and Foreign by setting (∂W j (τ j, τ−j) /∂τ j) = 0, where −j ∈ {H,F} \ {j}. It turns out
that both countries have a dominant strategy, i.e., each country’s best-response tariff does not
depend on the tariff imposed by its trade partner. This arises because of the assumptions that
markets are segmented and that firms face a constant marginal cost of production. Countries’
best-response tariffs thereby constitute the Nash tariff equilibrium of our one-shot game,
denoted by
(
τHN , τ
F
N
)
.5
3.3 Nash Tariff Equilibrium under Consumer Nationalism
Throughout the paper, we maintain the assumption that stronger nationalist consumer pref-
erences translate into a parallel outward shift of the demand for the domestic product ac-
companied by a parallel inward shift of the demand for the import product. In other words,
stronger nationalist preferences in, for instance, Home would imply a higher αHh and a lower
αHf .
To get some first insights into the ramifications of consumer nationalism for the multilateral
trading system, let us examine its impact on the Nash tariff equilibrium of our one-shot game.
As we discussed in the introduction, in line with the empirical findings in the literature
on cross-country differences in consumer ethnocentrism, we assume that there is asymmetry
in consumer nationalism between Home and Foreign. In particular, let us now introduce
nationalist consumer preferences only in Home and explore their implications for both τHN and
τFN . To this end, suppose that α
H
h = α˜
H
h +k and α
H
f = α˜
H
f −k, with k > 0 capturing the degree
of nationalism characterizing the consumers in Home, and α˜Hh , α˜
H
f denoting the α demand
parameters in Home in the absence of nationalist preferences among its consumers.
5The closed-form solutions for τHN and τ
F
N are cumbersome and are included in a technical appendix
(available from the authors upon request). Note that in a perfectly symmetric world, in which αji = α,
βji = β, γ
j
i = γ and ci = c for all i ∈ {h, f} and j ∈ {H,F}, τHN = τFN = β(2β+γ)(2β+3γ)[α+c(γ−β)]12β4−11β2γ2+γ4 .
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Nash Tariff
0 k
Foreign
Home
Figure 1: Nash Tariff Equilibrium and Consumer Nationalism
It can be readily shown that:
∂τHN
∂k
=
βHh
[
2βHf
(
3γHh + γ
H
f − 2βHh
)− 3 (γHh )2]
12 (βHh )
2 (
βHf
)2
+ (γHh )
2 (
γHf
)2 − βHh βHf γHh (3γHh + 8γHf ) . (18)
Thus, if βHi is “large” relative to γ
H
i and γ
H
−i—which is the reasonable assumption to make—
then
(
∂τHN /∂k
)
< 0, meaning that the Nash tariff of Home is decreasing in Home consumers’
nationalism (i.e., in k). Intuitively, when optimally choosing its import tariff, a country must
consider the marginal cost and the marginal benefit of protection, which are determined by how
consumer surplus, tariff revenue, and the profit of the domestic firm vary as the level of import
protection rises. Here, the dominant force driving the result is the fact that an increase in k
lowers, ceteris paribus, Home import demand (to the benefit of the domestic firm h), thereby
having a dampening effect on the tariff-revenue gain for Home from marginally raising τH .
On the other hand, the Nash tariff of Foreign, τFN , does not depend on the degree of Home
consumers’ nationalism (i.e.,
(
∂τFN/∂k
)
= 0), which is due to our assumptions of segmented
markets and constant marginal costs.
Figure 1 illustrates these results by depicting the Nash tariff equilibrium that would emerge
for different values of k in an otherwise symmetric world—i.e., a world in which α˜Hi = α
F
i = α,
βji = β, γ
j
i = γ, and ci = c for all i ∈ {h, f} and j ∈ {H,F}, but αHh = α + k > αFi = α >
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αHf = α−k—and under the “large”-β assumption.6 As Figure 1 demonstrates, in such a case,
τHN < τ
F
N for any k > 0.
4 Tariff Cooperation under Consumer Nationalism
In order to explore the implications of asymmetric consumer nationalism across countries
for multilateral tariff cooperation, we now allow for infinitely repeated interaction between
Home and Foreign. More specifically, we consider the infinite repetition of the two-stage
game analyzed above, while assuming that Home consumers exhibit nationalist preferences as
modeled in Section 3.3 (i.e., αHh = α˜
H
h + k and α
H
f = α˜
H
f − k, where k > 0). In each period—
comprising two stages—the governments choose import tariffs with perfect information with
respect to all past tariff choices. Moreover, let δ ∈ (0, 1) denote the discount factor between
periods.
As is standard in the literature on trade agreements, we assume that countries are limited
to cooperative agreements that are self-enforcing, i.e., agreements balancing for each country
its one-time gains from defection from the agreed-upon trade policies against its discounted
future welfare losses due to the trade war a unilateral defection would ignite.7 Furthermore,
to focus on the main points of our paper (and for tractability), firms are assumed to act
as Bertrand competitors in every period of the repeated game—i.e., the possibility of firm
collusion is excluded.
For this asymmetric game, we first consider asymmetric cooperative subgame-perfect equi-
libria in which (i) along the equilibrium path, Home and Foreign select, respectively, the
cooperative tariffs τHC < τ
H
N and τ
F
C < τ
F
N in each period; and (ii) if at any point in the
game a defection occurs, then both countries revert from the following period onwards to
non-cooperative Nash play. In other words, the countries employ grim-trigger strategies in
order to support multilateral cooperation. Of course, multiple such equilibria exist. Our focus
6Note that if βji = β and γ
j
i = γ, then
∂τHN
∂k =
β[4β(2γ−β)−3γ2]
12β4+γ4−11β2γ2 . Thus, in this case, a sufficient condition for(
∂τHN /∂k
)
< 0 is that β > 2γ.
7For an in-depth analysis of enforcement issues within the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade/World Trade Organization, see Bagwell and Staiger (2002).
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lies on the most cooperative equilibrium tariffs,
(
τ̂HC , τ̂
F
C
)
, where τ̂HC and τ̂
F
C are the lowest
non-negative tariffs that can be supported as an equilibrium outcome of our infinitely repeated
two-stage game.
We begin our analysis by looking at countries’ potential gains from cheating. Clearly, a
country opting to deviate from the cooperative course does best by selecting its best-response
tariff. The one-time gains from cheating for country j, then, equal:
Ωj
(
τ jC , τ
−j
C
) ≡ W j (τ jN , τ−jC )−W j (τ jC , τ−jC ) . (19)
Ωj simply equals the one-time welfare gains for country j from deviating to its best-response
tariff, τ jN , while its trade partner −j still cooperates with τ−jC .
However, violating multilateral cooperation comes at a cost as it leads to an infinite re-
version to non-cooperative Nash play. The discounted future welfare loss a defector faces is
given by:
δ
1− δ
[
W j
(
τ jC , τ
−j
C
)−W j (τ jN , τ−jN )] ≡ δ1− δωj (τ jC , τ−jC ) , (20)
where ωj
(
τ jC , τ
−j
C
)
is the per-period value of cooperation for country j, i.e., the per-period
difference in its welfare under multilateral cooperation and during a tariff war.
Using Equations (19) and (20), we can now formally state the no-defect condition for Home
and Foreign:
(Home) ΩH
(
τHC , τ
F
C
) ≤ δ
1− δω
H
(
τHC , τ
F
C
)
and (21)
(Foreign) ΩF
(
τFC , τ
H
C
) ≤ δ
1− δω
F
(
τFC , τ
H
C
)
. (22)
Any cooperative tariff pair
(
τHC , τ
F
C
)
that satisfies inequalities (21)–(22) can be supported as a
subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of the infinitely repeated two-stage game. Our interest
lies in the most cooperative equilibrium tariff pair,
(
τ̂HC , τ̂
F
C
)
, which can be obtained by solving
simultaneously (21)–(22) for the smallest tariffs that give equalities.8
As the model is rather complicated, we need to resort to numerical analysis in order to
gain some further insights into the implications of (asymmetric) consumer nationalism for
8As is typical in the literature on trade agreements, we assume that the discount factor is sufficiently low
so that neither country’s most cooperative equilibrium tariff equals to zero.
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multilateral trade cooperation.9 Furthermore, to focus on the main points of our analysis, we
assume henceforth that α˜Hi = α
F
i = α, β
j
i = β, γ
j
i = γ, and ci = c for all i ∈ {h, f} and
j ∈ {H,F}, with β being “large” relative to γ.10
The main result that emerges from our numerical analysis is that, for reasonable parameter
values, τ̂HC < τ̂
F
C for all k > 0. In other words, the country with the nationalist consumers is
able to maintain more liberal trade policies than its trade partner. The intuition underlying
this finding is rather involved. We proceed by analyzing in detail the impact of consumer
nationalism in Home on both countries’ one-time gains from cheating (i.e., Ωj) and per-period
benefit from cooperation (i.e., ωj).
Let us start by examining the ramifications of nationalist preferences in Home for its per-
period benefit from cooperation, ωH . To this end, note that multilateral cooperation results
in (i) lower prices in Home, especially for the import good, benefitting Home consumers; (ii)
a gain in sales and market share for firm h in its export market accompanied by a loss in
sales and market share in its domestic market; and (iii) a tariff-revenue loss for the Home
government. Consumer nationalism in Home affects, then, ωH—relative to the benchmark
scenario of no nationalism—via three channels. First, it acts to raise the relative importance
for firm h profitwise—in terms of both sales and markup over its marginal cost—of the Home
market vis-a`-vis the Foreign one, rendering the decrease in pHhNash and the loss in sales of the
Home firm in its domestic market both more costly from the firm’s perspective. Second, it
lowers Home import demand, which has a dampening effect on the consumer-surplus gain for
Home from multilateral trade liberalization. Third, it has a mitigating effect on the tariff-
revenue loss for Home from the reduction in Home’s tariff barriers, since it acts to lower
both the imports of Home from Foreign and the non-cooperative equilibrium tariff of Home
(i.e., τHN ). Our numerical analysis reveals that the first two forces (affecting negatively ω
H)
dominate, meaning that consumer nationalism in Home has an overall negative effect on its
per-period benefit from multilateral trade cooperation.
We next turn to the per-period benefit from cooperation for Foreign, ωF . Home consumers’
9The numerical analysis was carried out using Mathematica (the code is available upon request).
10Recall, though, that αHh = α˜
H
h + k and α
H
f = α˜
H
f − k, meaning that αHh > αFi > αHf . Moreover, in our
numerical analysis, we impose that β > 2γ (see footnote 6).
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nationalism affects Foreign welfare only via its impact on the aggregate profit of firm f .
Arguing as above, multilateral cooperation leads to a gain in sales and market share for the
Foreign firm in its export market (i.e., in Home) along with a loss in sales and market share
in its domestic market (i.e., in Foreign). At the same time, it results in a higher price net of
tariff, pHfNash − τH , received by firm f for its exports to Home—notwithstanding the fact that
pHfNash does decrease. Consumer nationalism in Home acts to diminish the relative importance
for firm f profitwise—in terms of sales and markup—of the Home market vis-a`-vis the Foreign
one, reducing the benefit to the Foreign firm from the gain in sales in Home and the rise in(
pHfNash − τH
)
. Therefore, Home consumers’ nationalism also affects negatively the per-period
value of cooperation for Foreign.
Finally, we explore the implications of nationalist preferences in Home for both countries’
one-time gains from cheating. Let us start with ΩH . Note here that a unilateral defection by
Home would result in (i) higher prices in Home, particularly for the import good, hurting Home
consumers; (ii) a gain in sales and market share for firm h in its domestic market; and (iii) a
tariff-revenue gain for the Home government. Consumer nationalism in Home has an impact,
then, on ΩH via three channels. First, as we discussed above, it acts to heighten the relative
importance for firm h profitwise of the Home market vis-a`-vis the Foreign one, increasing the
benefit to the Home firm from the gain in sales in its domestic market and the rise in pHhNash .
However, it also acts to lower the best-defect tariff for Home, τHN , which renders ambiguous
its overall effect on firm h’s profit gain in the case of defection by the Home government.11
Second, it lowers the import demand of Home, which, along with the fact that τHN is (strictly)
decreasing in k, has a mitigating effect on the consumer-surplus loss for Home associated with
its unilateral deviation from the cooperative course. Third, it has a dampening effect on the
tariff-revenue gain for Home from the increase in Home’s tariff barriers, as it entails both
fewer imports of Home from Foreign and a lower best-defect tariff for Home. According to
our numerical analysis, consumer nationalism in Home unambiguously has a negative effect
on its one-time gains from defection, implying that the tariff-revenue force is the dominant
11It turns out that for “high” cooperative tariffs, the profit gain for firm h associated with Home government’s
unilateral defection is lower under consumer nationalism in Home than in its absence, while the exact opposite
holds for “low” cooperative tariffs.
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one at play. On the other hand, Home consumers’ nationalism has no effect on ΩF , which is
a direct consequence of our assumptions of segmented markets and constant marginal costs.
To sum up, consumer nationalism in Home affects negatively ωH , ωF , and ΩH , whereas it
has no implications for ΩF . Our result that τ̂HC < τ̂
F
C for all k > 0 thereby follows.
12 At a more
general level, our analysis demonstrates that the country with the nationalist consumers can
sustain more liberal trade policies than its trade partner in our infinitely repeated two-stage
game.
In fact, for a sufficiently low discount factor δ, the most cooperative equilibrium tariff of
Home not only is lower than the one of Foreign, but also is decreasing in the degree of Home
consumers’ nationalism (i.e.,
(
∂τ̂HC /∂k
)
< 0 for “low” δ). The intuition underlying the latter
result is straightforward. Recall that consumer nationalism in Home affects negatively its
one-time gains from defection as well as its per-period benefit from cooperation. Note now
that the discounted value of future cooperation that appears on the right-hand side of the
no-defect conditions (21)–(22) is a function of both the per-period value of cooperation and
the discount factor. As a result, for sufficiently low δ, the pro-cooperation effect of Home
consumers’ nationalism on the incentive constraint faced by the Home government (i.e., its
negative impact on ΩH) is the dominant force at work. Thus, in the “low”-δ case, the higher
k is, the more liberal the trade policies that can be maintained by Home in equilibrium—
while the reverse holds in the case of “high” δ. On the other hand, τ̂FC is increasing in k
independently of δ, since Home consumers’ nationalism only affects (negatively) the per-period
value of cooperation for Foreign (and thereby the discounted cost for Foreign of a future trade
war). Figures 2a and 2b illustrate these results by depicting the most cooperative equilibrium
tariff pair
(
τ̂HC , τ̂
F
C
)
as a function of k under (i) the “low”-δ scenario (see Figure 2a); and (ii)
the “high”-δ scenario (see Figure 2b).
12Note that τ̂HC = τ̂
F
C if k were equal to zero, as in such a case, Home and Foreign would be perfectly
symmetric.
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(a) Low Discount Factor
Most Cooperative Tariff
0 k
Foreign
Home
(b) High Discount Factor
Most Cooperative Tariff
0 k
Foreign
Home
Figure 2: Asymmetric Most Cooperative Equilibrium and Consumer Nationalism
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5 Symmetric Multilateral Agreements
In this section, we explore the implications of asymmetric consumer nationalism across coun-
tries for multilateral tariff cooperation in the context of symmetric (self-enforcing) multilateral
trade agreements. What follows should be regarded as robustness analysis, as given the asym-
metry between Home and Foreign (due to consumer preferences), it is only natural to place
our main focus on asymmetric cooperative subgame-perfect equilibria.
Let τHC = τ
F
C ≡ τC denote the symmetric cooperative tariff selected by Home and Foreign
along the equilibrium path. We then have the following no-defect conditions for the two trade
partners:
(Home) ΩH (τC , τC) ≤ δ
1− δω
H (τC , τC) and (23)
(Foreign) ΩF (τC , τC) ≤ δ
1− δω
F (τC , τC) . (24)
From all the cooperative tariffs that satisfy (23)–(24), our interest lies in the most cooperative
one, τ̂C , which is the smallest tariff that does not violate (23)–(24).
Our numerical analysis shows that as τC is lowered, a critical tariff is eventually reached
at which the incentive constraint for the Foreign government binds, whereas the incentive
constraint for the Home government is slack (i.e., (23) holds with strict inequality at the tariff
in question). The fact that as the cooperative tariff is lowered, Foreign’s incentive constraint
is the first one to bind is not surprising given our analysis in Section 4. The aforementioned
critical tariff is the most cooperative symmetric equilibrium tariff of our infinitely repeated
two-stage game, τ̂C .
Figure 3 depicts τ̂C as a function of k. As the figure demonstrates, τ̂C is increasing
in the degree of Home consumers’ nationalism. Intuitively, consumer nationalism in Home
has no effect on Foreign’s one-time gains from cheating, ΩF , but it does have a negative
impact—for the reasons described in Section 4—on the per-period benefit from cooperation for
Foreign, ωF .13 Therefore, in the context of symmetric trade agreements, asymmetric consumer
nationalism across countries unambiguously has negative implications for multilateral trade
cooperation.
13We do not analyze here the impact of consumer nationalism in Home on ωH and ΩH as the incentive
constraint for the Home government is slack at τ̂C .
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 Most Cooperative Tariff
0 k
Figure 3: Symmetric Most Cooperative Equilibrium and Consumer Nationalism
6 Conclusions
We have presented the first theoretical analysis of the implications of consumer nationalism
for multilateral tariff cooperation. This is an important endeavor given that a large number
of empirical studies have documented the significant impact of consumer ethnocentrism on
consumers’ buying intentions and purchase behavior toward domestically produced goods and
imports. We have developed a two-country, two-firm model, in which the governments and
firms interact in an infinitely repeated two-stage game: in the first stage, the governments
choose their import tariffs, while in the second stage, the firms, which produce horizontally
differentiated products, select their prices in both markets. We have assumed that there
is asymmetry in consumer nationalism between the two trade partners and that nationalist
consumer preferences simply act as a demand shifter—which allows our results to extend to
the more general case of asymmetric consumption home bias across countries.
We have demonstrated that the country with the (relatively more) nationalist consumers
can sustain more liberal trade policies than its trade partner in our repeated-game setting.
Perhaps more importantly, as long as the discount factor is not too high—which is the empir-
ically relevant case—the most cooperative equilibrium tariff of the former country (i.e., the
country with the nationalist consumers) is decreasing in the level of its consumers’ national-
ism. On the other hand, the most cooperative equilibrium tariff of the latter country (i.e., the
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country with the non-nationalist consumers) is always increasing in the degree of nationalism
characterizing its trade partner’s consumers.
In conclusion, our analysis shows that the overall effect of asymmetric consumer national-
ism across countries on multilateral trade cooperation is ambiguous. Moreover, our findings
raise, at a broad level, the interesting possibility of an eruption of a multilateral trade war in
the wake of a surge in consumer nationalism around the globe, with the war in question being
fueled (primarily) by protectionist actions taken by the countries with the non-nationalist
consumers. Of course, further research is required in order to obtain a more complete picture
of the ramifications of consumer nationalism for the world trading system (e.g., in terms of
its impact on firms’ location choice). Still, our paper offers a first set of testable predictions
that are intuitive but not obvious.
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